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THE PUBLIC, THE MEDIA AND THE
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT: ACCESS TO
COURTROOMS PREVAILS OVER FEARS OF
PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
Public access to criminal trials historically has been an insti-
tutional feature of the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence.1
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reaffirmed this tra-
dition in State ex rel. Herald Mail v. Hamilton.2 The court held
that Article 3, sections 14 and 17, of the West Virginia Constitu-
tion guaranteed a right of access for the public and the press to
attend criminal proceedings. Closure of such proceedings effec-
tively has been precluded except in certain extraordinary cases
when a defendant can show that public access will irreparably
harm the constitutional right to a fair trial.4 However, the burden
of proof placed on defendants seeking closure is so stringent that
it may be impossible to meet.5 The Supreme Court of Appeals has
left for future determination the extent to which its "access" rul-
ing extends to all judicial proceedings, including civil and juvenile
1 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980), the
United States Supreme Court traced the historical development of public criminal
proceedings. Their public nature began in England before the Norman Conquest
when freemen were required to attend trials and render judgments. The jury sys-
tem developed after the Norman Conquest, but openness remained a fixed con-
cept in criminal proceedings. This "presumptive openness of the trial" was trans-
ferred to colonial America. The Court concluded that "the historical evidence
demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were adopted,
criminal trials, both here and in England, had long been presumptively open." See
also the majority and dissenting opinions in Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368
(1979). See generally F. POLLOCK, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, 1
SELECTED ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AmERcAN LEGAL HISTORY 89 (1907); E. CoK, 2 INSTI-
TUTES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 121 (6th ed. 1681).
2 267 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1980). The court handed down a unanimous judg-
ment; however, Justice McGraw's concurring opinion stated that the right of ac-
cess should be absolute. Id. at 552.
a W. VA. CONsT. art. 3, § 14 reads: "Trials of crimes, and misdemeanors, un-
less herein otherwise provided, shall be by a jury of twelve men, public ...... Art.
3, § 17 provides that "the courts of this State shall be open. ...
4 267 S.E.2d 544.
5 The difficulties faced by a defendant in justifying closure are discussed in
material contained in footnotes 39-49, infra.
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matters. Cases dealing with the right of the public and the press
to attend juvenile hearings, adoption proceedings, invasion of pri-
vacy suits, and the media's right to report sexual assault testi-
mony of minors and women likely will come before the court as
journalists and litigants clash over acquisition and publication of
information.
In Herald Mail, a defendant charged with two murders asked
that the public and press be excluded from certain pretrial hear-
ings.6 The newspaper company challenged the request. The trial
judge granted the defendant's request after an evidentiary hear-
ing. The judge barred public and press attendance at a hearing
concerning admissibility of certain statements made by the defen-
dant.7 Granting of closure came despite defense counsel's admis-
sion that local media had not prejudiced the defendant's right to
a fair trial through prior reporting.8 The newspaper appealed the
closure motion, asking the Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ of
prohibition. The court issued the writ, holding that the state con-
stitution guaranteed open court proceedings.
Although a case of first impression in this state, Herald Mail
represents a problem facing courts with recurring frequency.10
Federal and state courts are being asked to decide whether, and
when, a criminal defendant may deny the public and press access
to criminal proceedings by alleging that such attendance will im-
pair his ability to obtain a fair trial. This issue was faced directly
in 1979 by a fragmented United States Supreme Court in Gan-
nett Co. v. DePasquale1 and partially solved by a more harmoni-
6 267 S.E.2d at 545.
7 Id.
5Id.
9 267 S.E.2d 544.
10 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Hayes, 6 MEDIA L. REP. 1273 (BNA) (Pa. S. Ct.,
May 1, 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3365, Nov. 18, 1980. The court held that
the trial court erred in closing a pretrial suppression hearing when other alterna-
tives were available. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press docu-
mented 272 attempts at closure from July 2, 1979 to Aug. 15, 1980. Besides preju-
dicial publicity, grounds for closure have included state closure laws, danger to
defendant's life, privacy and safety of jury, and embarrassment to the witness,
victim, attorney, potential jurors, third parties, family and the public itself. Court
Watch Summary, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (August, 1980).
11 443 U.S. 368 (1979). Justice Stewart authored the Court's opinion finding
no right of access in the sixth amendment. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Pow-
[Vol. 83
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ous Court in 1980 in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.12
Herald Mail must be examined in light of these two cases.
Gannett and Herald Mail are similar in that both cases in-
volve public and press attendance at a pretrial criminal hearing.
In Gannett, a trial judge barred the public and press from attend-
ing an evidence suppression hearing in a murder case.1 3 The de-
fendant and the prosecutor had agreed to closure, and a reporter
ell, Rehnquist and Stavens, joined the opinion to form the majority. Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist wrote concurring opinions concerning the sixth
amendment. Justice Powell, while concurring with the majority opinion, argued
that while the first amendment provided a right of access, such access was not
absolute and the trial judge had followed permissible procedures in limiting the
right of access. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall, Brennan and
White, dissented, arguing that the sixth amendment created a right of access in
the public and the press.
12 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980). Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and
Stevens, wrote an opinion in which he concluded that the first and fourteenth
amendments guaranteed the right of the public and the press to attend criminal
trials, except where the defendant could show an overriding fair trial right articu-
lated in the findings. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in
the judgment, concluding that the first amendment, as applied to the states by the
fourteenth amendment, secured the public a right of access. Justice Brennan did
not reach the question of when the presumptive openness of trials could be over-
come. Justice Stewart, in a separate concurring opinion, argued that the first and
fourteenth amendments gave the public and press the right to attend criminal and
civil trials, but that such a right was not absolute. Justice Blackmun also con-
curred in the judgment, but reiterated his view expressed in the Gannett dissent
that the sixth amendment created the right of access. However, he concluded that
the first amendment, as a secondary measure, afforded protection of public access
to trials and that closure had violated these first amendment interests. Justice
Rehnquist dissented, arguing that neither the sixth nor first amendments required
that a state's reasons for denying access be subject to constitutional review as long
as the defendant, prosecutor and judge agreed to closure. Justice Powell did not
participate in the case.
13 443 U.S. 368, 392 (1979). Gannett arose from a murder trial in New York
State. A Rochester area resident disappeared while on a fishing trip, last seen in
the company of two young men. His bullet-ridden canoe was found in the lake,
but the body was not recovered. A Gannett-owned newspaper reported the disap-
pearance and the police theory that the man had been murdered. Two men were
arrested in Michigan soon afterwards. Their capture was reported as well as the
police theory that the victim had been robbed and murdered. Several other stories
were printed about the suspects' extradition to New York and their backgrounds.
Other stories reported the suspects' arraignment and indictment for second-degree
murder and larceny. At a pretrial suppression hearing, the defendant's counsel
contended that this reporting constituted an "unabated buildup" of adverse pub-
licity "which had jeopardized his [defendant's] right to a fair trial." Id. at 371-76.
1980]
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for the Gannett newspaper chain did not object until after the
motion was granted.14 The Supreme Court refused to consider the
newspaper's "right of access" first amendment arguments, but de-
cided the case by interpreting the sixth amendment public trial
guarantee. The Court defined the issue "as whether members of
the public have an enforceable right to a public trial that can be
asserted independently of the parties in the litigation."15 Read-
ing the sixth amendment literally, a very divided court found that
the amendment's guarantee of a public trial was a personal right
of the accused and did not confer a right of access to the public
and press.16 Even though the Court recognized a "strong societal
interest in public trials,' 17 the majority held that the common-law
tradition of open trials had not been included in the Constitu-
tion.18 Additionally, the majority found that eyen if a right of ac-
cess existed to trials, pretrial hearings constituted a separate and
distinct proceeding from the trial itself.19 Thus, any right of ac-
cess would not extend to pretrial hearings.
The Gannett dissent, however, argued that English and
American history showed pretrial hearings to constitute part of
the actual trial, and that the sixth amendment created a right of
access.2" The dissent, following the majority's lead, based its
views solely on the sixth amendment.
The media and some constitutional scholars virulently at-
tacked the Gannett decision as another attempted emasculation
of the first amendment by the Burger court.2 1 The media raised
the spectre of justice being subverted in closed courtrooms while
a powerless press was stymied in newsgathering efforts. Closure
" Id. at 392.
Is Id. at 382-83 (emphasis added).
s Id.
17 Id. at 383.
Is Id. at 385. While the Court found that the public could not compel a public
trial, the Court also stated that the defendant could not compel a private trial. Id.
at 382.
19 Id. at 387-91.
20 Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"I Allen Neuharth, Gannett president, called the ruling "another chilling
demonstration that the majority of the Burger court is determined to unmake the
Constitution." The Washington Post, July 3, 1979, at 10, col. 1. The Post editori-
alized: "The Supreme Court has forgotten the wise words of Lord Acton: Every-
thing secret degenerates, even the administration of justice." Id.
[Vol. 83
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orders multiplied as defendants and judges turned to closure to
avoid the constitutional difficulties involved in prior restraint of
the press. 22 Confusion reigned as lawyers and judges tried-to in-
terpret Gannett's multiple opinions.2 3 Individual justices took the
unusual step of publicly trying to explain the decision. 4 Thus the
stage was set for Richmond Newspapers.
The case began in an historic Virginia courtroom as the State
tried for the fourth time to convict the defendant of murder.2.
The defendant's conviction in the first trial had been overturned
on appeal. Two subsequent trials ended in mistrials. The defen-
dant sought closure in the fourth trial to prevent dissemination of
testimony to potential witnesses waiting outside the courtroom.2
He made no allegation that prior publicity existed which would
be aggravated by a public trial. The prosecutor voiced no objec-
tion, and the trial judge, citing a Virginia closure statute,27 ap-
proved closure. The trial judge made no findings that an open
trial would harm the defendant's right to a fair trial.2
22 Professor Laurence Tribe, who was to successfully argue the press' case in
Richmond Newspapers, anticipated this development. After the Gannett decision
was handed down, he labeled it "a threat to a free press and an informed citizenry
... there will be no need to gag the press if stories can be, choked off at the
source." Id. at 1. See note 10 supra.
'3 See note 11 supra.
3' Chief Justice Burger explained in an interview with the Gannett News Ser-
vice that the decision applied "to pretrial proceedings only." N.Y. Times, Aug. 9,
1979, at A17, col. 1. Three weeks later, Justice Blackmun told federal judges in
South Dakota that the opinion authorized closure of all trials. N.Y. Times, Sept.
4, 1979, at A15, col. 1. Justice Stevens followed with a speech implying he would
limit Gannett to pretrial proceedings. Justice Powell told an American Bar Associ-
ation gathering that judges might be "a bit premature" in interpreting Gannett to
authorize exclusion of the press, but not the public. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1979, at
A13, col. 1. The 1979 Supreme Court Term - Constitutional Law, 93 HARv. L.
REV. 62, 65, n. 32 (1979).
25 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2818 (1980).
16 Id. at 2819.
11 VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (1975 Replacement Vol.). "In the trial of all criminal
cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its
discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the
conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial shall
not be violated. .. ."
28 100 S. Ct. at 2819. After the judge approved closure, the defendant moved
for another mistrial, claiming that certain evidence should not have been admit-
ted. The judge directed a verdict of not guilty. Id. at 2820.
1980]
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The newspaper company appealed the closure order, but the
Virginia Supreme Court denied the appeal, as well as petitions for
writs of mandamus and prohibition.
2 9
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower courts,
but did so on first amendment grounds rather than Gannett's
sixth amendment rationale. The Court held that the first amend-
mentas applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment, pro-
vided an independent right of public access to criminal trials.80
Trials are to be open except when a defendant can show a sub-
stantial probability that an open trial will irreparably damage the
right to a fair trial.8 1 The Court's opinions made clear that closure
will be granted only after a trial judge has determined that less
drastic measures will be insufficient to protect the defendant's
fair trial right.
Chief Justice Burger distinguished Gannett by reasoning
that it concerned access to pretrial hearings only. 2 Gannett also
had been decided on sixth amendment, not first amendment,
grounds. At the present time, therefore, a distinction remains at
the federal level between access to pretrial and trial proceedings.
It remains to be seen whether the Gannett dissenters will join
other members of the Richmond Newspapers majority to find
that the first amendment also provides a right of access to pre-
trial hearings.8 8 It is arguable that Gannett is now moot. In Gan-
nett, Justice Powell specifically found that the first amendment
provided a right of access to pretrial hearings.8 4 The Gannett dis-
senters, who were yvilling to find such a right in the sixth amend-
ment, all concurr6d in the Richmond Newspapers judgment that
the first amendment provided a right of access to trials. Assuming
those Justices would extend such a right to pretrial hearings, as
they indicated in Gannett, a five-person majority exists for a first
amendment right of access to pretrial hearings.
However, unlike the federal system, no such distinction exists
29 Id.
30 Id. at 2829.
1 Id.
31 Id. at 2821.
33 For an early discussion of Richmond Newspapers' impact on Gannett, see
6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) No. 11 cover sheet, News Notes (July 15, 1980).
-1 443 U.S. 368, 399-400 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
[Vol. 83
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss2/8
ACCESS TO COURTROOMS
in West Virginia. Herald Mail provided for access to both trial
and pretrial hearings.3 5 The Supreme Court of Appeals specifi-
cally adopted the Gannett dissenters' viewpoint that pretrial
hearings are part of the actual trial process; therefore, this right
of access applied to all stages of the criminal trial process.36
However, similar to Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, the
Herald Mail decision allows closure in certain situations. 37 An ex-
amination of the requirements for closure as set out in those
cases, however, reveals that the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has made it difficult, if not impossible, for a defendant to
prove the need for closure.
In Gannett, under the sixth amendment, closure was a mat-
ter of agreement between defendant, prosecutor and judge.38 Al-
though the Supreme Court stated that open criminal hearings are
preferable, a defendant did not have to show irreparable harm to
the right to a fair trial. Justice Powell stated that a trial judge, in
order to approve closure, had to determine whether public access
was likely to jeopardize a fair trial.39 Thus, under Gannett, the
defendant was in the favored position, reflecting the Court's find-
ing that the sixth amendment was a personal right of the accused.
Herald Mail, decided three weeks before Richmond Newspa-
pers, adopted a much more stringent burden of proof. In West
Virginia, a defendant must show that adverse publicity already
exists at the time of the judicial proceeding sought to be closed.40
Next, he must show a clear likelihood that an open proceeding
will result in irreparable damage to the right to a fair trial.41
Proving this latter requirement is to be accomplished by showing
the extent of prior hostile publicity, the probability that the is-
sues involved in the proceeding will further aggravate adverse
publicity, and that traditional judicial techniques to insulate a.
jury from the consequences of such publicity will not alleviate
the problem.42
3- 267 S.E.2d 544, 550 (W. Va. 1980).
36 Id.
37 Id.
:9 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
"Id. at 400.
4: 267 S.E.2d at 551.
41 Id.
42 Id. (emphasis added).
19801
7
Harrell: The Public, the Media and the Criminal Defendant: Access to Court
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83
The Herald Mail test resembles that adopted by the Su-
preme Court in Richmond Newspapers. In the latter case, Chief
Justice Burger stated only that a defendant show that his right to
a fair trial will be impaired by access in order to justify closure,
but implied that closure should be available only in unusual
cases.' Justice Blackmun, author of the Gannett dissent, spelled
out the actual test in his concurring opinion.4 Now, a defendant
must show a substantial probability that an open trial will result
in irreparable harm to his right to a fair trial, that traditional
alternatives will not protect this right, and that closure will pre-
vent prejudicial information from becoming public.45
Thus, Herald Mail and Richmond Newspapers have shifted
the burden of proof to the defendant, with the burden approxi-
imating that levied against a defendant seeking prior restraint of
the press.'6  This is appropriate since closure has become a
method of avoiding prior restraint.'7 Closure technically is not
prior restraint because the latter involves restraint of publication
of information already possessed by the media, not a blocking of
newsgathering efforts. However, closure accomplishes the same
result as prior restraint-prevention of dissemination of informa-
tion usually in the public sphere of knowledge.
43 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2830 (1980).
44 Id. at 2841 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
4' The Supreme Court recently denied review to an 8th Circuit case which
held that a criminal trial cannot be closed without a showing of substantial
probability of harm to a defendant's right to a fair trial, that no alternatives are
available and that closure will be effective against the perceived harm. United
States v. Powers, 622 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1980), No. 79-1960, cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3222, Oct. 6, 1980.
4' Judicial hostility to prior restraint has been a continuing first amendment
theme in the 20th century. Compare Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (law
making it a public nuisance to maliciously criticize local government officials
struck down); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (federal
government's attempts to halt publication of Pentagon Papers barred); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (lower court order forbidding the press
to report open court proceedings overturned). But see United States v. Marchetti,
466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th
Cir. 1975); Snepp v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 763 (1980). These cases approve the
use of prior restraint contractual secrecy agreements which require former CIA
employees to submit all planned publications to the agency for prepublication
review.
", See note 22 supra.
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It is accurate to say, then, that Herald Mail will deny closure
to defendants except in the most extensively publicized cases.
Even in these cases, the burden of proof may be so great that it
will be impossible for the defendant to justify closure. The key to
proving the need for closure lies in showing that traditional tech-
niques of insuring a fair trial will not work.
Such traditional techniques, as developed in various fair trial
and prior restraint cases, include change of venue, extensive and
searching voir dire, delay of trial and sequestration of the jury.48
These techniques are used to lessen any possible effect of prior
publicity upon potential or actual jury members as an alternative
to restraining the media from informing the public about judicial
activities. The burden of providing defendants with fair trials is a
necessary task of the judiciary, not the press.
All these techniques, however, go to insuring fairness during
the actual trial. Consequently, a defendant trying to close a pre-
trial hearing will have to prove that these procedures will not ef-
fectively insulate a jury at some future time from publicity occur-
ing before the jury selection process even begins. Proving
irreparable damage, therefore, becomes very unlikely. This diffi-
culty of justifying closure will exist also during trial. Exposure to
past publicity does not automatically preclude selection of an im-
partial jury.4'9 Once a trial has commenced, sequestration is a use-
ful method of preventing undue influence on the jury. Sequestra-
tion obviously is unavailable as to pretrial hearings.
Yet even if the burden of proof is very great, it will be a rare
case in which a defendant cannot employ the insulation tech-
niques to his benefit, at least in West Virginia. Media coverage in
this state is limited in comparison with more urban states. Only
one newspaper circulates statewide and no television or radio sta-
tion broadcasts throughout the state. 0 Associated Press and
United Press International provide wire services to newspapers
and broadcast media in West Virginia, but few media outlets sub-
scribe to both organizations. Therefore, proving existence of wide-
spread hostile publicity to the extent that even a change of venue
4 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1966).
4, Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
50 The Charleston Gazette maintains statewide circulation.
1980]
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would not result in a fair trial will be difficult. Only in the most
notorious crimes, such as the "Son of Sam"-type slayings or cases
involving recognized statewide figures, will sufficient statewide
coverage occur to possibly justify a finding that closure alterna-
tives are infeasible.
Herald Mail, while settling the question of closure in crimi-
nal trials, leaves other issues unanswered. The Supreme Court of
Appeals held that the state constitution guaranteed a right of ac-
cess to criminal trials.5 1 The court did not specify whether the
right of access was to extend to all judicial proceedings. The
"open court" language contained in the state constitution does
not distinguish between criminal and civil cases. A fair reading of
the decision indicates that all court proceedings are to be con-
ducted in view of the public, except when extreme prejudice to
the defendant can be shown. Consequently, this case provides
support for members of the public and press seeking access to
such proceedings as juvenile and adoption hearings,02 invasion of
privacy civil suits, domestic cases highly embarrassing to one or
both of the parties, the testimony of juveniles and women in sex-
ual assault cases, 83 and pretrial civil suit settlement conferences.
Defining the extent of the right of access may result in a case-by-
case review of which interests are to be balanced against the ac-
cess right. For example, protection of a juvenile from trauma and
embarrassment while testifying is a recognized responsibility of
the judicial system." However, such an obligation has been held
not to constitute sufficient grounds to justify closing a trial be-
cause of the compelling interest in insuring that the public main-
tains confidence in the integrity and credibility of the trial pro-
cess.8 5 Another legitimate basis for requiring open proceedings in
all matters is the wording of the state constitution. Unlike the
sixth amendment to the Constitution, West Virginia's open court
provision is a public right, not a personal one to the accused.88
51 267 S.E.2d 544, 546-47.
as See State ex rel. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. Deiz, 6 MEDIA L. REP. 1369
(BNA) (Oregon S. Ct., June 18, 1980). Court ruled that state statute providing for
closure of juvenile court violated open court provision of state constitution.
"See Lexington Herald Leader Co. v. Tackett, 6 MEDIA L. REP. 1436 (BNA)
(Ky. S. Ct., June 24, 1980).
4Id.
"Id.
267 S.E.2d at 547. The court specifically found that article 3, section 14
[Vol. 83
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Herald Mail, while dealing specifically with a right of access
to the courts, may have additional implications in the media's
continuing battle to gain judicial recognition of a constitutional
right of access for the media in their newsgathering efforts. This
battle has been waged primarily in the federal courts, with the
media losing in almost every case.57 The Supreme Court's position
has been that, although some protection needs to be afforded
newsgathering rights," the media may claim no greater rights
than the general public. 59 Thus, the media have lost in efforts to
prevent disclosure of confidential sources 0 or to gain access to
places not normally accessible by the public.'s
Both Richmond Newspapers and Herald Mail contain lan-
guage reiterating the idea that the media's right of access is only
that of the public.2 But at least one Supreme Court justice spe-
cifically recognized in Richmond Newspapers that "for the first
time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference
with access to important information is an abridgement of the
freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the First
Amendment. ' '" 3 Indeed, Richmond Newspapers will be cited by
media lawyers in the future as support for a press right of
access."
It is arguable that Herald Mail may be used to support the
proposition that the Supreme Court of Appeals should recognize
such a specific media right of access to important information
under the state constitution's "freedom of the press" clause.65
confers a broader right than the sixth amendment to the Constitution.
57 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978). The Supreme Court held
that the press did not have a superior right of access than that of the public;
therefore, if access was denied the public to tour a jail, the media could not de-
mand access.
5 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
, 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
*' 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
*' 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
,2 100 S. Ct. at 2825; 267 S.E.2d at 549.
,3 100 S. CL at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring).
. Richmond Newspapers has been cited in briefs before the Supreme Court
in a case challenging the constitutionality of allowing cameras in the courtroom.
Chandler v. Florida, 366 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1978), appeal docketed No. 79-1260 (U.S.
Supreme Court Aug. 26, 1980).
'8 W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 7 states: "No law abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press, shall be passed. .. ."
1980]
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The court has been cognizant of the special role played by the
press in ferreting out information which the public may not oth-
erwise receive.66 If the court is willing to find a specific right of
access by the public and press under the state constitution's judi-
cial clauses, recognition of a media right of access under the free
press provision requires only a slight extension of the press' rights
and obligations. Expansion of these rights under the state consti-
tution would not be the first time this court has afforded greater
protection to fundamental rights than that provided by the Su-
preme Court under the federal Constitution. 7 Given the Supreme
Court's hesitancy to recognize explicitly a first amendment right
to gather news as well as publish it, perhaps it is time the media
directed their efforts toward the state level.
This right of access is viewed by journalists as a logical ex-
tension of their ability to publish without governmental interfer-
ence. Without the freedom to gather newsworthy information
from all sources, the right to publish loses some of its value, at
least in the eyes of reporters barred from meetings or forced to
reveal sources.68
The developing "structural" model of the media's societal
role advocates protection of the newsgathering process. This
method of analysis "focuses on the relationship of the press to the
communicative functions required by our democratic beliefs."6 9
Traditional first amendment theory has not focused on this struc-
tural approach, but rather has emphasized such values as freedom
of individual belief and the desire to create a marketplace of
ideas. 70 Adoption of the structural method will require expansion
of first amendment protection to the newsgathering process. "The
press is [then] not only shielded when it speaks out, but when it
267 S.E.2d at 549.
67 See State ex rel. McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1978). The
coult ruled that entitlement to tenure constituted a sufficient property interest to
a college teacher to require a procedural due process hearing before tenure could
be denied. In Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979), the court held that
education was a fundamental right under the state constitution; therefore, any
discriminatory classification found in the school funding system was invalid unless
the state demonstrated a compelling interest to justify unequal treatment.
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
69 Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGEsS L. REv. 173, 177 (1979).
10 Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 AM. B. FOUNDA-
TiOml RESEARCH J. 523, 524 (1977).
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performs all the myriad tasks necessary for it to gather and dis-
seminate the news.
7 1
In summary, Herald Mail has decisively guaranteed the pub-
lic's and press' right of access to the courts. It does so by requir-
ing the defendant to meet a heavy burden of proof before closure
of courts will be considered. This is a valid burden of proof be-
cause of the American democratic system's traditional openness.
Mere reporting of crime and the subsequent judicial process does
not automatically jeopardize a defendant's right to a fair trial.
Publicity is a necessary adjunct of a democratic, open society.
During a trial, it helps to insure the accuracy and completeness of
testimony 2 as well as insure fairness to the criminal defendant.
73
A vigorous press is as necessary to a fair trial as an unbiased
jury.7 ' A trial's purpose is not just to adjudicate facts, but to ful-
fill a larger societal role of public catharsis.
78
It remains to be seen, however, how far the media and courts
will develop this right of access. Civil suits and other sometimes-
closed proceedings may become more open to public scrutiny.
Furthermore, the media may attempt to use Herald Mail as a
springboard to judicial recognition of a media right of access and
newsgathering independent of the public's right of access. Devel-
opment of the idea that the media has "a structural role to play
in securing and fostering our republican form of self-govern-
ment"7 6 likely will determine the limits of Herald Mail.
W. Martin Harrell
71 32 RuTGERs L. REV. 173, 177.
72 J. WIGMORE, 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1834 (Chadburn ed. 1976).
73 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2839 (Brennan, J., concurring).
74 Id. at 2837-38.
75 Id. at 2832.
76 Id. at 2833 (emphasis added).
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